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ne of the hallmarks of Eugene White’s
scholarship is his knack for using
detailed historical examples to raise
large, thought-provoking questions.  “Were
Banks Special Intermediaries in Late
Nineteenth Century America?” is no
exception.  White combines case studies 
of two small ﬁnancial institutions, the Bank
of A. Levy and the Emigrant Savings Bank,
with other information on nineteenth-cen-
tury banking theory and practice to high-
light banks’ “specialness” during that
period—that is, their unique ability to
serve as delegated monitors for savers.  He
then argues that a fall in the cost of infor-
mation eroded this specialness in the
twentieth century.  The result, according to
White, was a steep decline in banks’ share
of the assets of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
My goal in this comment is less to crit-
icize White’s argument than to amplify and
recharacterize it—to make stronger his
case that, by the early twentieth century,
banks had lost many of the attributes that
allowed them to perform the role of dele-
gated monitors more effectively than other
kinds of ﬁnancial institutions.  I will begin
by countering White’s case studies with
the example of a late  nineteenth-century
institution, the Suffolk Bank of Boston,
that had largely abrogated its position as
delegated monitor.  I will then use what is
known about the evolution of managerial
practice within banks in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries to argue that
the Suffolk example is more representative
of historical trends than the cases White
describes.  Banks’ earlier informational
advantage had derived from the imbedded-
ness of their ofﬁcers in the communities
within which they did most of their lending.
As credit markets lost their local character,
these advantages disappeared, and banks
increasingly had to rely on the same




White uses the examples of the Bank of
A. Levy and the Emigrant Savings Bank to
highlight the information services that, he
argues, were at the heart of banks’ special-
ness in the late nineteenth century.  The
former institution was a small rural com-
mercial bank in Ventura County, California.
Its president, Achille Levy, knew borrowers
personally and traveled around the county
on horseback in order to monitor their
activities.  The second, a mutual savings
bank in New York City, was run by promi-
nent members of the Irish immigrant com-
munity who presumably were personally
acquainted with the mortgagees to whom
they lent the bulk of the bank’s funds.
White makes no pretense that these cases
are representative, but he does imply that
they capture in important ways the kind of
information-gathering facilities that made
banks special.
The problem is that it is easy to offer
counterexamples.  One bank that appears
to have behaved very differently was the
Suffolk National Bank of Boston.  During
the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, 
as Rolnick, Smith, and Weber describe in
their contribution to this volume, Suffolk
was the most important bank in Boston
and exerted what was in effect regulatory
authority over the notes issued by all the
banks in the New England region.  This
regulatory role ended before the Civil War,
however, and by the late nineteenth century,
the Suffolk was just one of a considerable
number of large banks in the city of Boston.
A brief run of its lending records is extant
from the turn of the century, and close
examination reveals that very few of
Suffolk’s loans derived from activities of
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the sort that White would label as special.
For example, 46 percent of the Suffolk’s
portfolio (by value) consisted of collateral
loans, 84 percent of which were granted to
brokers and other intermediaries who dealt
in the securities markets.  These loans were
backed by securities that bank examiners
regarded as readily marketable.  That is, in
lending on the basis of this collateral, the
Suffolk Bank was not making use of any
special informational advantage; it was
only accepting securities that were gener-
ally perceived by the investment community
to be of high quality.  The other 54 percent
of Suffolk’s portfolio consisted of short-
term loans based on personal security, but
approximately two-thirds of these (by value)
were notes purchased on the commercial-
paper market.  Only 19 percent of the bank’s
portfolio consisted of notes backed by per-
sonal security (one- or two-name paper)
that were discounted for the beneﬁt of sig-
natories who were customers of the bank.
In other words, only 19 percent of the bank’s
portfolio consisted of loans for which the
bank might perform some special informa-
tional role (Lamoreaux 1994, p. 128).
TRENDS IN BANK 
MANAGEMENT 
Suffolk, of course, is just one example,
but it is an example that I would argue was
representative of larger trends in the banking
system.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to
demonstrate this claim by analyzing a large
sample of banks’ loan portfolios.  Very
little information of this sort is extant.
Instead, it is necessary to approach the
problem more indirectly—by thinking
about what is known about banks’
management structures and practices
during this period.
Nineteenth-century banks typically
had very lean managerial hierarchies.  For
example, national banks were governed by
a board of directors, one of whose members
was elected president.  The daily affairs of
the bank were generally run by a cashier,
who might work alone or, depending on
the size of the institution, might be assisted
by one or more tellers and clerks, and per-
haps a bookkeeper.  For most of the century,
the cashier was the chief operating ofﬁcer.
Presidents (like other members of the boards
of directors) were usually part-time ofﬁcers.
They had other business interests to which
they devoted their primary attention 
(Lamoreaux 1994, pp. 3-4).
This type of managerial structure under-
went some changes over time.  For example,
by the end of the century it was increasingly
common, especially at large urban banks
like Suffolk, to have presidents who had
previously served as cashiers and who
devoted all their time to their banks (Lam-
oreaux 1994, pp. 123-4).  But the important
point is that, whether the chief of operations
was the cashier or the president, he super-
vised relatively few people.  In particular,
there was little investment in the nineteenth
century in developing the organizational
capability to collect and process information
about the creditworthiness of borrowers.
To the extent that banks had an informa-
tional advantage over other ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, it was a personal one that derived
from having a chief ofﬁcer who was well
connected locally, had repeated dealings
with the same people, and spent time (as
A. Levy did) traveling around the commu-
nity checking up on borrowers.1 A bank
might also gain additional information
about potential borrowers by choosing for
its directors people who had good knowl-
edge of particular segments of the business
community and who were willing to use
this knowledge for the beneﬁt of the bank. 
The kind of information that nineteenth
century banks acquired through their ofﬁ-
cers was thus local and personal.  It derived
from the imbeddedness of these men in the
communities from which most of the insti-
tutions’ borrowers were drawn.  A lender
who was not similarly imbedded did not
have access to information of comparable
quality.  Such a lender might subscribe, for
example, to the reports of credit agencies
like the R.G. Dun Company, which had
corresponding agents, often lawyers, located
in communities throughout the country.
These agents gossiped with local merchants,
kept their ears open, and reported any news
that might affect the creditworthiness of
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potential borrowers.  There is reason to
believe, however, that for much of the cen-
tury this kind of information was inferior in
quality to that obtained by local bank ofﬁcers
for their institutions.  After all, bankers had
access to all the same sources of information
as the agents of the credit agencies.  In addi-
tion, they had the direct knowledge that
came from their own private dealings 
with borrowers.
Even in this period, however, there
were important limits on the kinds of infor-
mation that banks were able to collect.  For
example, it was not generally considered
appropriate to ask borrowers for ﬁnancial
statements.  Even bankers, therefore, had
only impressionistic evidence of their bor-
rowers’ net worth.  Like White’s Achille
Levy, they based their lending decisions as
much on their assessment of an applicant’s
character as on precise information about
income and liabilities. 
THE DECLINE OF  
LOCAL LENDING
This limitation on information collecting
would become more important over time.
By the end of century, the informational
advantage that bankers derived from their
local imbeddedness and from their repeat
dealings with borrowers was increasingly
inadequate (and regarded as so by contem-
porary observers), especially in the most
economically developed and urban areas 
of the nation.2 Part of the problem was the
trend toward single-name paper that White
discusses in his essay.  Loans on personal
security were more risky than they had been
earlier because they were backed only by the
wealth of the maker, not the maker plus one
or more endorsers approved by the bank.  A
more important problem for our purposes
was the growing tendency for businesses to
borrow from more than one ﬁnancial insti-
tution and also to ﬂoat commercial paper 
on the market.  As a result, it was now more
difﬁcult for bankers to get a good sense of 
a borrower’s ﬁnancial position just from
their own repeated dealings with the indi-
vidual (James 1978, pp. 55-59; Lamoreaux
1994, pp. 89-90).
Banks dealt with this problem by moving
to require formal, sometimes audited, ﬁnan-
cial statements from borrowers.  They also
began to invest in information-gathering
capabilities, creating new credit depart-
ments whose business was to keep track of
customers’ creditworthiness.  These devel-
opments came relatively late.  As White tells
us, ﬁnancial statements were not in common
use, even in large banks, until the 1890s; in
small banks the delay was much longer.
Credit departments were also ﬁrst organized
in the 1890s.  As late as 1899, only 10 banks
had them, and they were all in New York.
I would like, however, to question
whether these investments in the organ-
izational capability to collect information
about borrowers really did much good in
the sense of allowing banks to recapture
their informational advantage over other
kinds of ﬁnancial institutions.  After all, any
lender could require a ﬁnancial statement.
Moreover, to the extent that borrowers
sought loans from multiple institutions 
and ﬂoated commercial paper on the
market, banks were not particularly well
placed to assess the truthfulness of these
statements.  As a result, banks ultimately
had to depend on external sources of veriﬁ-
cation such as independent audits, informa-
tion collected by credit agencies, and (later)
tax returns—sources of information that
were available on the same terms to other
ﬁnancial institutions.
There was, of course, another pos-
sibility.  Banks could have embraced what
Charles Calomiris and others have called
“universal banking” and developed long-
term relationships with the companies to
which they lent funds, taking equity posi-
tions in the ﬁrms and naming directors to
their boards.  In that way, they could have
gained inside information about income
and net worth and also, perhaps, some say
over the companies’ managements.  But
U.S. banks did not go this route.3 Instead,
they coped with their growing information
problems in a number of alternative ways:
by requiring customers to maintain deposits
with them worth a certain percentage of
their credit line;4 by keeping borrowers on a
short leash and forcing them to renew their
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loans frequently;5 and even, as the Suffolk
Bank essentially did, by giving up the whole
idea of maintaining an informational advan-
tage and engaging in the kinds of lending
that did not require special knowledge (for
example, lending to stock-market brokers
on the security of readily marketable stocks
or buying commercial paper on market).
Suffolk’s strategy, by the way, was not partic-
ularly proﬁtable, and the bank’s stockholders
voluntarily reduced its capital in the early
twentieth century.  Banks’ other coping
mechanisms also proved ultimately imprac-
ticable as pressures from regulators and
competition from other lenders forced them
to give up the idea of compensating deposits
and to lengthen lending terms in the twen-
tieth century (Lamoreaux 1994, pp. 101-2, 
pp. 136-7, p. 163).
In the end, therefore, banks’ loss of spe-
cialness was not so much a result of a fall in
the cost of information as of a lack of advan-
tage in collecting the kinds of information
needed to assess the creditworthiness of bor-
rowers operating in the geographically wider
markets of the twentieth century.  Informa-
tion costs are undoubtedly a part of this
story, but not, I think, in the way White 
originally intended.  The story I would tell
would be one that emphasized the decline 
in local lending.  Banks were special in the
nineteenth century because, unlike most
other ﬁnancial institutions, they were located
close to their borrowers.  As local lending
declined, banks’ informational advantage 
disappeared.  Not surprisingly, their market
share also dropped as a consequence.
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